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Chapter 1
Freedoms and the institutional
Americanism of literary study
To open the chapter with a quotation:
In Derrida's work an ambivalent and marginalised French-Jewish-Algerian
voice, both coloniser and colonised, is absorbed into and reinflects the elitist
eclecticism of Parisian intellectual culture, and this produces such paradoxi-
cally authoritarian pronouncements as 'what is proper to a culture is not to
be identical to itself "
This sentence is a quotation from a hypothetical book. It forms a would-
be demystifying account of the intellectual career of Jacques Derrida,
offered in terms of the dominant cultural political paradigm. This kind
of authoritative culture speak is often taken as the kind of thing any
aspiring critic should aim for, with its combined effect of sweeping pano-
rama, political astuteness and explanatory power. In fact, though, such
a sentence is twaddle: for it misleadingly and at once asserts the basis of
a thinking to ue wholly in social identity and cultural location (Derrida's
specific background in this case).
This chapter will tty to map out some things at stake in the poetics of
singularity by setting it against some dominant features of contemporary
literaty and cultural theory, as exemplified by this hypothetical (I hope)
book on Derrida. This is to argue that, for all the frequent dedication to
progressive causes, the culture of criticism today often undercuts or com-
promises the freedom it seems to defend by promulgating only a specific,
even a bourgeois Western model of it. Against this, my point is not, pri-
marily, to offer some sOrr of alternative cultural-political line on the texts
discussed here (though it may probably be read that way in any case, so
deeply ingrained are the assumptions that this is the only way to tead).
Instead, the overall argument is what might be termed a post-existential-
ist one: that the thinkers covered here each contemplate the poetic and ut-
erary in terms of an uncomfortable freedom, one which will challenge the
dogmatism in thinking in terms of cultural-political determinism.
12 The Poetics of Singularity
Throughout, the topic of singularity is shown to feed into the distinctively
post-existentialist thinking of the four thinkers, offering an alternative
model of the challenge of the literary that is shown often to be ethically
superior to the dominant culruralism. To treat something as singular is to
move towards the idea of seeing it as irreplaceable, sole witness of what it
says, an example only of itself, and thus 'free' in the sense of not being fully
intelligible in the broadly deterministic categories of culturalism, which
strives to explain all in terms of social location.
Jean-Luc Nancy argues that 'absence of foundation is foundation for
democracy'.2 He is perhaps alluding to Claude Lefort's work on the dis-
tinctiveness of the modern idea of democracy, that of all the regimes
known, it 'is the only one to have represented power in such a way as to
show that power is an empry place and to have maintained a gap between
the symbolic and the real', that is to affirm that those who exercise power
'do not, indeed, embody it'.3 One danger for democracy lies in the very
temptation to find foundations for it, for these may too soon serve to pre-
scribe specific institutions or groups of people as a positive or even exclu-
sive model of the democratic more generally. However, I believe this is
exactly what has happened in much contemporary literary and cultural
theory and that the idea of democratic freedom at work there is often an
anachronistic and even damaging onc. Against this, the poetics at issue
here can be related to a notion of 'freedom' that Jean Luc Nancy and
others work out from Heideggerian thinking, hermeneutics and decon-
struction. The issue is less to disagtee head-on with the dominant cultu-
tal studies paradigm, but to investigate the way it is often destructive of
its usually worthy ideals. The political philosopher Wendy Brown argues
'how certain well-intentioned contemporary political projects and theo-
retical postures inadvertently redraw the very configurations and effects
of power that they seek to vanquish."
So the basic argument of this chapter is to contrast two ideas of freedom.
The dominant cultural politics paradigm rests on notions of freedom that
look, implicitly or explicitly, to the traditional discourse of rights as it
demarcates the claims of identities taken as already given. Opposed to this,
however, is the more disconcerting but also less circumscribed idea of
freedom inherent in Hannah Arendt's notion of 'beginning', a state of
radical emptiness prior to or outside given determinations of identity and
ethical and legislative norms. Another way of expressing this is through
what the political philosopher Paul Pallon terms 'critical freedom', 'criti-
cal' here referring not to the institution of criticism, but to the notion of a
crisis or turn.ing point, one 'at which some state or condition of things
passes over into a different state or condition'. Panon contrasts 'critical
freedom' with the other 'liberal' model:
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Critical freedom differs from the standard Iilxcal concepts of positive and neg-
ative freedom by its focus upon the conditions of change and transformation
in the subject, and by its indifference to the individual or collective nacure of
the subject. By contrast, traditional liberal approaches tcnded to take as given
the individual subject and to define freedom in terms of the capacity to act
without hindrance in the pursuit of onc's ends or in terms of the capacity to
satisfy onc's most significant desires.s
In so far as the poetics of singularity can be identified with any kind of
cultural politics, it can be said to affirm critical freedom against the limits
and assumptions of the liberal model.
Individual freedam
The association of literature and notions of freedom is all pervasive in
Western poetics, so deeply ingrained that it is rarely made explicit. Ideas
of freedom have been the central reference point for poetics since the
eighteenth century. Shanesbury, David Hume and others argued that
civic freedom is both a condition for achievement in the arts and is sus- ,.
tained by them." Romanticism has onen been defined as an intellectual
movement dominated by reactions both for and against ideas of individ-
ualliberry associated with the American and the French revolutions. The
promotion of individual or social freedom became in effect, aftet the
decline of patronage, the dominant argument fot the utility of literature.
Defences of literature in the twentieth century repeatedly linked it to
ideas of democracy, dissidence and democratic debate, the right of free
speech. In an interview of 1992, for instance, Derrida defended literature
as an institution peculiar to modern societies with a democratic element,
those with conventions and laws which enable an institution of language
within which anything can be said, and in any way (SIL). In 1948 Jean-
Paul Sartre defended the literary as a supreme enactment of human
freedom: 'The book does not serve my freedom; it requires it.'7 Sartre
corroborated Kant's argument that the artwork is an end in itself but
argues that this does not sufficiently 'account for the appeal which
resounds at the basis of each painting, each statue, each book' (p. 34).
For the work only exists if it is first seen or read. It must appeal to a
reader as a condition of its effective existenCl~. So 'the author writes in
order to address himself to the freedom of readers, and he requires it in
order to make his work exist' (p. 36).
During the Cold War the association of literature with democratic values
often focused on the writing of dissident authors behind the Iron Curtain.
The association of the literary institution and freedom has if anything
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intensified since then. This may be borne out by the growing tendency to
categorise literature in terms of various 'minority' social groups whose
'voice' it is taken to be. The increasing diversification of criticism into com-
peting camps attests further the centrality of ideals of freedom as what is
at stake in each. .
The dominant conception of freedom implicitly at work in the institu-
tion of literature for the past two hundred years has generally been the
liberal one: it has frequently formed the idea, for author or reader, of a
mode of self-discovety and self-realisation against whatever may be inau-
thentic in tradition, in received norms of thought and behaviour or
overly conventional elements of the personality. Such underlying ideas of
the utility of literature come to accompany its increasing association
with, even absorption by, institutions of education. The idea of freedom
at issue here intertwines negative and positive elements. It is negative in
so far as it affirms the right of an individual or a group to be rid of
oppressive force, falsifying dogmas or mere delusion: it is positive, cor-
relatively, in understanding this casting off as the assertion or realisation
of an identity hitherto suppressed. Service to such a concept of freedom,
usually too broadly assumed to be explicit, still functions as the domi-
nant idea of what a modern writer is for.
Assumptions and aspirations about freedom have informed not only
the dominant conception of the social function of the writer but also
technical minutiae concerning genre, form and technique. One of the
crucial arguments to inform this link between ideas of art and ideas of
individual freedom was Immanuel Kant's notion of aesthetic 'disinter-
est', that a kind of detachment or 'disinterestedness' is the condition of
the beautiful and of its true perception. This does not mean that the
spectator of a painting or reader of a poem should adopt a kind of
passive contemplativeness, rendering art some sort of escapist enter·
tainment. The notion of 'interest' at issue here simply means that which
is important for its relation to something else. So a 'disinterested' entity
in this sense is just one valued for its own sake, as its own end and
seeming purpose. Thus, for Kant, the relation to the beautiful is dis-
interested in the sense of being unconstrained. As such it is not merely
a putting out of action of the will, a kind of apathetic stepping out of
things las in Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's misreadings of Kantian
disinterestedness). It is a realisation or affirmation of its object, freed to
exist in itself, apart from the need to be justified in relation to other
things or ends.
Thus, for Kant, the aesthetic was a realm of freedom, defined in terms
of autonomy or self-legislation - something realising its essence uncon-
strained by 'external' factors. lay Bernstein writes:
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In claiming that works-of art are devoid of external ends, and hence products
of actions done for their own sake, Kant is insisting that such production not
only presupposes freedom in the weak sense but manifests freedom, instan-
tiates it, aims at it, has freedom for its meaning. Such acts are the production
of freedom through freedom"
The claim of freedom extends, necessarily, to the disinterested nature of
the person encountering a work of art, judging whether something is
'beautiful' or not. The judgements of taste as to beauty are 'free' in that
they can hold up a specific work as an 'example' of successful art but
never as a rule embodying principles to which all other supposedly beau-
tiful objects must conform. The lack of a definite rule that could deter-
mine in advance whethet something is 'beautiful' or not is no deficiency:
it is crucial to the link between such judgements and Kant's ideal of
freedom as autonomy. Aesthetic judgements may be general ones - not
just expressions of personal preference - but they will only be genuinely
aesthetic judgements if each person making them is following, without
prejudice or interest, their own mind and really saying what they think.
In this way, the claim of the aesthetic is also that of a liberation of our-
selves from falsehood, from mere conformity or self-deception (e.g.
saying that 'x is beautiful' because it is the fashion or the king approves
it), In other words, the ideal of a universality founded on unconstrained
judgements, of people deciding for themselves, correlated easily with
emerging ideals of enlightened govemment. Anyone judgement of taste,
then, cannot be a rule, only an 'example' that others might follow or not.
The would-be universality of the judgement that 'x is an excellent work
of art' can exist only on the basis of such agreement freely achieved.
Kant's importance here is that his arguments enabled an assimilation
of issues in aesthetics and poetics to the general political tendency of the
post-Enlightenment, the 'liberal' one. 'Liberalism' can be described here,
following K. A. Appiah, as the recognition of civil and political rights to
freedom in the protection of the individual person against state power
and space for self-development and self-ereation:
What characterizes the beginnings of liberalism is, then, a combination of
political institutions: constitutions, rights, elections, and protections for
private property. In the twentieth century, in both Europe and OM America,
there was added [Q thC' rrcognition of these political rights a concern to guar-
antee cenain minimum conditions of welfare for every citizen, what we call-
even if the extension of the term T;gh~ in this way is a little controversial -
economic and social rights.'
The Kantian ideal of aesthetic autonomy dovetails so neatly into think-
ing in terms of individual right that it became what surely remains the
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most powerful principle of artistic form in Western art to this day. The
repeated ideal is that the work not be shackled by inherited norms but
rather achieve, from out of itself, the form appropriate to it, one that
most expresses its distinctive nature. A rhetoric of innovation and liber-
ation becomes standard in manifestos of artistic schools and poetic
creeds. With some exceptions (the religious poetics of G. M. Hopkins for
instance) the freedom of the artwork came to stand repeatedly for
various images of human freedom. The liberated form of the modern art-
work, in fields as diverse as, say, Naturalist fiction, <free verse' or the aims
of the surrealist movement, is held to enable or release topics or elements
of the human psyche and perception previously suppressed. We see this
in modernist ideals of achieving some pure essence of the poetic that
might be opposed to more exploitative or commercialised facets of
culture. It reappears in so-called postmodernism, whether this be in a
work's use of pastiche and fragmentation to defamiliarise and free itself
from inherited genres and modes, or in the now widespread notion of the
act of writing as a kind of performance or 'construction' of 'the self'. 10
Some basic assumptions of contemporary criticism
Literary culture has formed an indispensable pillar of democratic debate,
offering an arena for suppressed voices or issues to incite public notice
or controversy. Even critics who take a more suspicious view of the work-
ings of power and 'ideology' in literature, as in its appropriation as a
bastion of traditional values, still belong to and hence reaffirm the same
public sphere of open debate. This broad allegiance also characterises the
thinking I am schematising here under the rubric of the poetics of singu-
larity. However, this school also challenges some inherent norms of this
broadly liberal literary institution as it has existed for over two centuries,
finding it still limited and oppressive in crucial respects.
To turn now to the far narrower field of the critical institution today:
with the dominant cultural politics paradigm the liberal conception of
freedom has become prominent almost to the point of self-caricature. Let
us try to schematise those aspects of the current critical orthodoxy which
are at issue here. The schematisation is broad, but should be very famil-
iar to anyone in contact with the culture of the humanities academy.
At the basis of the cultural studies paradigm - often even when it does
lip service to thinkers who implicitly differ in this respect - remains the
ideal of freedom in the sense of the Kantian and modernist ideals of self-
legislation. Countless critical arguments, reading the major issues in a
text as some sort of struggle for economic independence and/or personal
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fulfilment, often simply assume as a norm the model of autonomy or self-
legislation. These readings enact, in other words, the notion of freedom
as the realisation of a suppressed or distorted essence, affirmed against
kinds of inhibition to it, whether these be the power of tradition, social
oppression, the ideological connotations of the medium or systematic
prejudice. That is to say, the text is seen in terms of the self-assertion or
contestation of identities, understood as part of the impulse to self-
realisation of a group, class or nation. ]n weaker critics, this has tended
towards the stance that the only things in a text of final interest are those
stateable in terms of such a model of contestation (so William
Wordsworth's 'Tintern Abbey', for instance, is 'really' (as they say) a
textual strategy expressing the stance of a disillusioned radical in the
insecure context of England in 1798).
Why attack such thinking at all? Its democratic credentials at least
seem generally clear. One problem is that the model of freedom that
looks to notions of rights and individual autonomy is a long way from
being neutral. The fundamental claim of this critical practice is that a
notion of identity, either as given or striven for, can serve as an exhaus-
tive principle of explanation for anything in or of the text at issue. That
is, anything which a person of type x or of type y does or writes can be
understood as a representation of that x-ness or y-ness. Identity, whether
individual or collective, is held to be an agent whose every representa-
tion or act is at once an affirmation or assertion of itself. Hence, a writer
who finds herself describable as, say, 'gay', 'Iranian' and 'Christian' will
ha ve critics striving to explain all she writes in terms of the self-making
of that 'identity'. Cultural processes are seen as the labour of various and
often competing representations, with the underlying issue a 'freedom'
understood as an identity's self-realisation.
Here, though she never writes explicitly of literary criticism, the work
of the political philosopher, Wendy Brown, is indispensable, especially her
work on the ever-eontentious meaning of 'right' or 'rights'. In contempo-
rary cultural politics and criticism, the model of human agency as the
striving towards self-possession/realisation draws implicitly on some
deeply entrenched assumptions about 'rights'. 'Rights', as Brown argues,
originated primarily as a social safeguard for an individual, free to enjoy
hislher property apart from threats of arbitrary state power on the one
hand and social disorder and theft on the other. II As they form part of
such a general social framework, she argues that an appeal to rights in
contemporary disputes often forms a double-edged sword. For 'rights'
necessarily codify systems of power, ideas of property and of (constituted)
identities even as they seek to protect those caught up in them. This is why
Brown is uncomfortable with talk of striving for the 'rights' of minorities
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- for such 'rights' also tend to entrench and confirm the disadvantaged
identity they nominally protect. Likewise, she is wary of 'the emergence
of politicized identiry rooted in disciplinary productions but oriented by
liberal discourse IOward protest against exclusion from a discursive for-
mation of universal justice' (p. 58). Such a set-up may reinforce an essen-
tial pillar of the domination it seemingly contests: 'It reiterates the terms
of liberal discourse insofar as it posits a sovereign and unified "I" that is
disenfranchised by an exclusive "we"' (pp. 64-5). In effect, work on kinds
of contestation for cultural power and recognition is too often 'tethered
to a formulation of justice that reinscribes a bourgeois (masculinist) ideal
as its measure' (p. 59). It reinforces the norm by its way of protestation
of exclusion from it, an exclusion that allows its advocate only a moral
superioriry with a hidden investment in its own impotence (p. 73).
Likewise, a focus on domination in politicised literary criticism too often
shrinks in practice 10 the mere policing of inequalities. Brown argues that
there is a need to find ways of contesting domination through a better
vision of collective life, not through moral reproach (p. 47).
Brown's point is not that such a model of cultural politics misses
genuine grievances and deprivations, but that it gauges these in terms of
an ideal taken from within the social framework being criticised (hence
the stress on 'exclusion', 'marginalisation'J etc. with their implicit, under-
hand valuation of the central as norm). In this way, instead of politics
being a matter of aspirational ideals as to the nature of living together
well, such thinking surreptiously confirms as a human norm an ideal of
personhood and self-conception which is that of the privileged.
Even while this structure of thinking -the ideal of individual autonomy
pitched against repressive authority or falsehood - is sometimes criticised,
its basic contours continue to determine the vast majority of literary crit-
ical practice. 'Culture' itself is broadly understood as the antagonistic,
multi-layered, heterogeneous interaction of different groups, each assett-
ing and working their self-representations according to the same model.
Hence the tendency 10 make all politics mean identity politics and to see a
'radical' stance as 'a voluntarist politics of seif-affirmation'.11 Sometimes
this may become an identity politics that can only continue to affirm itself
and its insignia (its positive freedom) by re-enacting and even seeking out
marks of past oppression against which to restage its effoTts (its negative
freedom), hence, in literary criticism, the sense that far too much work
hinges about the reaffirmation of values which almost all readers will
already have. Brown notes that
institutionalized freedom premised upon an already vanquished enemy keeps
alive, in the manner of a mdancholic logic, a threat that works 35 domination
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in the form of an absorbing barrie with the past. Institutionalised freedom
arrayed against a particular image of unfreedom sustains that image, which
dominates political life with irs specter long after it has been vanquished and
preempts appreciation of new dangers to freedom posed by institutions
designed to hold the past in check. (p. 8)
Criticism of this kind can train its weaker students merely to an unschol-
ally complacency - the idea that lO give a critical teading of a wotk
means just to hunt out some features of prejudice in the characrers or
contexts, put markers on them and walk off in triumph.
The issue is exacerbated by the philosophical laxity of contemporary
theory. A general vague acceptance of elements of anti-foundarionalist
arguments bolsters too quickly arguments tha t all things be seen in terms
of a cultural politics that affirms modem notions of freedom as self-real-
isation on behalf of under-represented groups, without a sense of the spe-
cifically liberal model of subjectivity such notions depend on and
reinforce. Hence the unthematised rhetoric that pervades so much criti-
cism: 'prison' ('prison house of language'), 'imprisoned', 'escape', 'free
ourselves from', 'chained to', 'hemmed in by', 'held captive by', 'hostage
ro', 'subverts power" 'challenges the authority of', 'defies', 'resists'.
Transgressive' or lsubversive' become ultimate terms of praise; to call a
text lmarginalised' becomes to flag up its massive centrality, the non-
canonical functions as a kind of canon, and so on.
After Kant, formal and rhetorical innovation and the supposed liber-
ation of some facet of the human are continually correlated. The same
dynamic plays itself out in the cultures of criticism and commentary.
Jonathan Ree argues that much contemporary thought, however alertlO
issues of historicity, is itself hiddenly dominated by a form of historicism
by virtue of what he terms its 'modernist' institutional culture:
For modernisn is nor so much a particular style, as a particular kind of histor-
ical self-consciousness abour style. Irs twin imperatives are to avoid being pro-
vincial and to avoid being out-oE-date; or, to pur it more positively, to conform
with the norms which govern the up-and-coming epoch. It divides the world
with a single fence, with its own brave modernity on this side and stupefied
provincial traditions on the other..Modernism, one might sa)', is a streamlined
hisroricism. 1J
Such modernism, reinforced by the basic institutional ftameworks in
which criticism and discussion take place (professional competitiveness
and surveillance), perpetuates Enlightenment ideals of freedom as self-
legitimation, of self-affirmation as the being liberated flOm ignorance or
prejudice. What disturbs Ree is the kind of personal culture and self-image
that too often emerges out of a broadly worthy Enlightenment tradition,
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and which 'we' critics find it hard not to adopt. He writes, 'the ultimate
rhetorical and dialectical device of modernism is the phrase "no longer"
along with claims that x or y in some author is "astonishingly modern"'
(pp. 974-5). The objects of such a modernist consciousness appear on a
scale calibrated from ~radical' on one side through to 'progressive', 'tradi-
tional', 'conservative' and finaUy treactionary' on the other. It rna y become
at worst 'an epochal self-consciousness that does nothing except chronicle
its own timeliness' (p. 976). The under-acknowledged basis of modern
criticism becomes a kind of academic imaginary that makes the critic into
a hero or heroine of a progressive narrative of liberation through knowl-
edge. In other words, assumptions that critics may well attack in texts they
are studying still actively determine the culture of intellectual production
for critical work (such as that surrounding this very book), and are built
into its institutional requirements. Ethically, such a stance always threat-
ens to be less genuinely 'engaged' than a simplifying striving to do away
with politics altogether as a space of inherent moral entanglement, uncer-
tainty and difficult decision.
Deconstruction 'modernised'
The institutionalised dominance of the (liberal) model of agency may
underlie the way the massive effect of thinking associated with decon-
struction and the work of Derrida has played out in practice since the
early 1980s. The liberating effect of such work was a defining feature
of intellectual life in the last quarter.of the twentieth century but it hap-
pened in large part through the assimilation of 'deconstructive' modes
of thinking into the essentially 'modernist' ones built into profession-
alised criticism as an institution. This can be seen especially in the
legacy (from the earlier Derrida) of a conception of 'the metaphysical'
as a block mode of thought held to be definitive for the West and its
history. Texts and people are continually subjected to kinds of trial
procedure designed to either condemn or acquit them of degrees of
complicity in metaphysicaVcoloniaVpatriarchal thinking. Herman
Rapaport writes:
In postcolonialisr studies we are told by many researchers that metaphysics is
the reigning paradigm of colonial thinking; and, for some decades now, fem-
inists have argued that patriarchal writing is inherently metaphysical andlor
phallogocemric. In each case an anrimcraphysical ideology has been extir-
pated from deconstruction, and its polemical force is that of a test that distin·
guishes ~tween correct and incorrect thinking,'"
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In this way, in the modernist cultute of criticism, supposedly superseded
notions of progress, of subjectivity and freedom, have re-entrenched
themselves in ways deeply antipathetic to the less aggressive understand-
ing of deconstruction. One problem with the freedom as autonomy
model that has re-emerged is its inherent violence in positing a central
identity conceived as a striving against an antagonist in the form of tra-
dition, prejudice, etc. In so far as the critic also tends to identify with the
agent of this struggle, it produces an us/them polarisation that is conflic-
tual, confrontational and often unhelpfully self-righteous.
In Derrida the recognition that there are 'identifications' rather than
identities, or that identities are constitutively non-identical, pushes his
later work towards an affirmation of universal exceptionalism and sin-
gularity (that' Every other (one) is evety (bit) other' [tout autre est tout
autre]).IS In culturalist work that nominally looks to Derrida, on the
other hand, recognition of division within identities was often assimi-
lated to the modernist liberal model. It produced a certain structure of
thought that now underlies perhaps the majority of new critical interpre-
tations of literaty works.
The argument of deconstruction on the impossibility of any unitary
identity and the irreducibility of the singular has been assimilated as
something that is only superficially similar. The decisive step is taken
when this impossibility is taken to determine a psychology. A good
example here is William Connolly's formulation: 'Identity requires dif-
ference in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order
to secure its own selJ-certainty.'16 In other words, a constitutive lack is
held to underlie a drive towards 'identity', so that denial of the lack or
otherness within the would-be unitary self is argued to manifest itself in
a rejection or suppression of real others outside. This produces a seem-
ingly neat formula for sketching the workings of structures of domina-
tion and prejudice: the would-be secure identity (say of a masculinist
self-image as hero) lives in a state of denial of its own lack which may
lead to immediate social-political effects (e.g. casting the other as 'the
native' and inferior). At the same time, the 'marg-inalised' other retains,
in this set-up, a pivotal position that is immediately ready to be cele-
brated as its tsubversive' potential. In other words the deconsrrucrive
argument has become transformed into a kind of all-explanatory first
cause in cultural politics, a psuedo-explanatory and ubiquitous psycho-
logical drive whose generality enables it to embrace almost any kind of
human activity in terms of categories of identity/otherness and inclu-
sion/exclusion. Take, for instance, the famous mid-Victorian sensation
novel by Mary E. Braddon, Lady Audley's Secret (1862). In this novel
the central figure initially corresponds to an idealized female stereotype
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of youth, beauty and demute defetence. In fact, Lady Audley emetges as
both a bigamist and a determined would-be murderer. Io the modern
reception of this book, critics argue that she comes to be vilified in the
narrative because she held the place, especially in the minds of women
readers, of that angry 'otherness' whose denial is at the basis of a socially
sanctioned identity, even as, at the same time, her actions supposedly
enact the attractions of that ·otherness'. So, Lady Audley's condemnation
and final incarceration as lmad' are thus, it is argued, 'necessary' to the
socially sanctioned standard of sane normality in Victorian lifeY
However crudely workable this reading, its basic underlying assumption
is that of a universal drive for (a certain idea of) identity which is irself
never examined. Such a mechanism for social explanation is now almost
ubiquitous in the reading of literature and culture. It is widely adaptable:
such otherness/within (exclusion as inclusion) structures of supposed
self-assertion can be made to work for almost any cultural context, as in
the suppositious account of Derrida with which this chapter opened. It
can be applied equally to individual psychology and to the self-definition
of large cultural groups. For instance, Henry Yu mars an interesting essay
on Tiger Woods and multiculturalism by drawing on the same question-
begging formula in a seemingly succinct summary of the joint origins
of American nationalism and racialism: 'Trying to prove their worth
in a transatlantic world dominated by British culture, postcolonial
Americans created definitions of whiteness that both celebrated and den-
igrated what was perceived to be native to the United States.''' Was it
really so neatly simple? This model's breadth of application, however,
also suggests its vacuousness. Such readings drive an all-flattening
highway through the real complexity and multiplicity of human events.
They are insidiously reductive in that they always pivot around one
unexpressed but all-determining norm, that of a supposedly narural drive
towards self-asserrion in self-definition. An entity, whether single or col-
lective, is held to be striving for or assening a unitary identity, one whose
self-realisation is asserrion against others. This is the 'ideal' whose seem-
ingly built-in desirability shapes the contours of everything in a text
being discussed: the contestation of various kinds of identity interacting
with and 'constructing' each other in this aggressive drive towards self-
legislation. Although critics may refer on the surface to psuedo-decon-
structive or psychoanalytic arguments, it is most often this hidden liberal
and even neo-Darwinian model that determines the reading.
When a critical essay refers to the 'construction' of identity it is most
often this implacable norm that is working itself out." In other words,
the supposedly anti-essentialist gesture (identity is made or is a project,
not a given) is not what it seems at all, for an assumed norm as to what
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identiry is in the first place (made or given) is already decisive. It deter-
mines what Peggy Kamuf satirises as a critic's working out of someone's
"'racedassgender" coe,fficient".20 Derrida's insight is turned into a
methodological tool for describing once more the interaction of various
competing groups striving for autonomy. Deconstruction is absorbed as
a move or moment in what is basically the same old set-up.
Notions of identiry as a 'social construction' - for all their seeming
endorsement of anti-essentialisr arguments against identities being seen
as 'given', still in fact draw upon the very notions of subjectiviry that are
nominally at issue. For although such counter-cultural constructions may
be argued by critics to be 'subversive' of the dominant order, this very
way of thinking surreptitiously reinforces its aggressive norms. It does
not change the basic conceptual function or structure of a term to put
inverted commas around the use of it, especially when that use is still
pivotal to the whole argument.
Institutionol Americonism
Wendy Brown writes that 'contemporary political moralism tends to
conflate persons with beliefs in completely nonvolunteristic fashion:
persons are equated with subject positions, which are equated with iden-
tities, which are equated with certain perspectives and values. To be a
white woman is thus equated with speaking or thinking as a white
woman... '11 What Brown does not see perhaps, and which is conceiv-
ably more difficult to think from within the United States than across the
ocean, is a further dynamic that may govern the stance occupied by that
critic who sets out to explain the features of a text in terms of the work-
ings of such 'subject positions' (e.g. x does x because she is a woman,
another does y because she is white, while z affirms the view of an Inuit
man etc.). This intellecrual stance also works to define the person who
takes it. In other words, it expresses a drive to position oneself as the
embodiment of a supposedly fully enlightened eye to whom all these sup-
posed subject positions and identities are visible and morally mappable.
The progressivist culture of professionalised criticism makes this stance
extremely hard to avoid. In addition, the old ideals of detachment and
objectiviry in a critical writing inevitably acquire a moralistic tinge with
this particular model of cultural mapping. Even writers who affirm their
own ethnic or other particulariry often really do so from the position in
which freedom is inherently embodied in the overview of the critic.
From a genuinely international perspective there is yet another strik-
ing aspect of the cultural politics paradigm in criticism. Its generally
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'modernist' culture matches exactly one of the most familiar and insidi-
ous traits of American nationalism, its aggressively self-idealising excep-
tionalism.21 This is not so much a matter of what the criticism says, but
the performative effect at work every time a critical text in English impli-
citly posits its author and implied reader as embodiments of some sup-
posedly fully enlightened humaniry against whom other people, in the
present or the past, can be gauged and rendered transparent in terms of
unredeemed tradition, a merely limiting particulariry and various modes
of supposedly all-explanatory prejudice. Given the latently moralistic
nature of such a stance, together with the general domination of the
humanities by people employed by American universities, the result is
what may be termed the 'institutional Americanism' of critical debate.2J
This names both the pervasive identification of the critical arena in
general with the norms and assumptions of an American institutional
context, and the insidious presence in criticism of what is effectively, and
sometimes explicitly, an American nationalism. This is meant, necessar-
ily, not as the assertion of a nationality taken as given but in terms of the
dominant forms of identification that lead people to suppress the recal-
citrance of their singularity, or as Derrida put it, to suppress the
'Marranas that we are, Marranos in any case, whether we want to be or
not, whether we know or not' (the Marranos were Spanish and Portugese
Jews forced to confrom ourwardly to Catholicism, but practising
Judaism in secret)."
It would surely be unsurprising if the criticism to become dominant
since the late 1980s should be one later thinkers might label as a post-
Cold War triumphalist movement (just as the formalism of the 1950s is
sometimes related to the Cold War conservatism of those times). In fact
it would be surprising if it were not. However, if the institutional
Americanism of critical thinking is almost never an issue as such, this is
because its dominance is such as to render it frequently invisible.
To attend an international conference is always to be reminded how
far nationalism as such remains as deeply pervasive as it is disavowed
among critics, a vast but tacit determinant of so much intellectual work.
However, institutional Americanism in the sense proposed need not
mean simply the overt Ot hidden assertion of an assumed 'American'
identiry (often couched in terms of spuriously ahistorical ideals). It is a
force of identification (in fact, many of the ugliest cases of 'institutional
Americanism' 1have met have been in Britain and Australia). One thing
at issue is the widespread use of the first person plural ('we') to describe
a communiry of critics and scholars presumed to be following, albeit con-
tentiously, a continuously unfolding and broadly progressive project of
communal labour (e.g. 'we no longer give credence to the argument that
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.. .', 'what w. n«d now is .. .' .tc.). Th. probl.m with this ubiquitous
practice is not only its obviously modernist culture (in Ree's sense), but
also, given their numerical weight, the way voices within the US academy
drown out others to the extent that this 'we' is frequently simply taken
to mean no on. ds<. Thus the editors of a large critical anthology,
Feminisms (1997), write in their introduction, in what s<ems to take its<lf
as a gesture of openness, 'We conceive "'literary theory and criticism" as
the realm of what is taught today in American d.partments of English'!25
Likewise, innum<rabl. essays assume their reader to b. simply a col-
league at another American institution, so that many British and other
non-US critics have, unwittingly it se.ms, adopted the habit of writing as
if they w<re in the US. There are also mOr< obvious effeers of power and
numocrs. For instance, a critic publishing work in any English-speaking
country will almost always have that work assessed by a r<ader whose
specific job is to gauge it against a possibl. US r<adership, so giving that
market an effective v.to and hdping perpetuate a US-centric view of the
world.
'/W/hat is proper to a culture is not to be identical to itself.' The antag-
onist of D.rrida's r<mark is any form of nationalism, namdy the id.ntifi-
cation of a singular peopl. or peopl<s as the privileged embodiment of
suppos<dly univ<rsal valu<s. Nationalism affirms the particularity or
even ethnicity of a specific peopl. as examples, the ocst exampl<s, of
valu<s with a mor< g.n<ral claim, implictly d.nigrating others.
Analogously, the 'w.' of professionalised criticism, for all its supposed
diversity, recruits its members to a culture of the 'good conscience'.26 It
slid<s towards ocing a pr<dominantly American kind of .xceptional-
ism,27 a praetition<r of that peculiarly mod.rn kind of bigotry which con-
sists in ocing too h.n to attribut< pr<judic. or moral fault to oth<rs as
a principl. for int<rpr<ting th.ir actions or words.
Institutional Americanism often vitiat<s what ought to have be<n the
generally globalising scope of modern criticism and thought. While rec.nt
thinkers in postcolonial theory, for instance, are coming to r<cognise the
tension between its sweeping cultural categories (coloniser, subaltern, mar-
ginalised, etc.) and the particularity of lit<rary t<xts, a cultur. of the good
consci.nce still ling<rs. Thus, on on. side, for instanc., D.epika Bahti's
Native Intelligence: Aesthetics, Politics. and Postcolonial Literature (2003)
is sc.ptical of some effects of the way some postcolonial th.oty has hard-
ened into a routinis<d disciplinary space:
A disciplined and predictable form of posrcolonialiaty enters the academic
and social arena, confounding any deep understanding of the economic and
political rtalities of a postcolonial world whose shu.r stu, if not its internal
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diversities, complexities, and saving grays. ought to have rendered it immune
from such violently formulaic reductions.28
This institutionalised complacency grates against what Bahri shows to be
a 'text's singular and miniaturised interface with the general' (p. 8). At the
same time, however, some oppressive effects of the modernist culture of
criticism itself soon become evident in her own argument, as Bahri goes
on to illustrate the reductiveness of some postcolonial typecasting in a
specific case. Bahri attacks what has become postcolonial stereotyping by
unpacking the way what she warily terms the 'Irish case' disrupts some of
the dominant categories. However, the terms in which this argument
deploys itself still remain so crudely generalising and appropriative as to
suggest that even Bahri's own criticisms remain on the wrong ground.
As follows: the Irish, Bahri writes, have undoubtedly been at times an
object of ethnic vilification, yet, contrary to the usual scheme, they are
white. Geographically, they are European, not 'third world'. The Irish
have had to resist projects of colonial acculturation and assimilation to
British norms on the one hand, but, on the other, many of them were
active partners in the military and commercial business of the British
Empire. And again, on one side, Irish critics have seen parallels between
their own literature and writing from India, Africa, etc., but, on the other,
Irish nationalism has its own strain of white triumphalism. There is also
'Ireland's own recent history of protectionism against the third world
and its poor record of aid' (p. 68), and so on. In fact, such 'protection-
ism' would be a European Union matter, not a specifically Irish one, but
the fact that Bahri still needs to make her case by this kind of moral
points-scoring view of histoty is itself, ironically, already a vindication of
it: the danger of a 'glib reduction of the complex circumstances of colo-
nialism to a disciplinarily intramural drama with a cast of characters
comprised of usual suspects and predictable victims'. Even with Bahri's
chapter, a certain goodies-and-baddies-thinking is evident in the way 'the
English' (seeming often to mean 'the British') are assumed, cartoon-like,
to constitute a homogenous body to be immediately and unproblemari-
cally identified with imperialism. In fact, Bahri's history is inaccurate
library cramming: Ireland is called 'the oldest of England's colonies' (p.
60), overlooking the contentious cases of Wales and Scotland, as well the
inept anachronism of terms such as 'colonies' and even 'England' in rela-
tion to what was a Norman kingdom that also included much of France;
the Scotsman Thomas Carlyle (more than six centuries later) is quoted
as an instance of 'English' perceptions of the Irish (p. 59). The ambition
to complicate the basic tools of some postcolonial theory seems timely,
but that even this should result in work so simplisric is troubling when
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the issue is scenes of historical and contemporary violence fot which
'denial of the singulariry of each person' could be one description. Bahri's
'Irish case' chapter both argues against and yet still instatiates the intel-
lectual crudity and unhelpful moralism of using sweeping labels of cul-
tural identity as a principle of interpretation, as against the scrutiny of
always singular cases and the accompanying ethics of scholarly accuracy.
The detailed strength of Bahri's other chapters, which, unlike the 'Irish
case' chapter, engage detailed and specific readings of Rohinton Mistry
and Salman Rushdie, supports the same point - that merely fine-tuning
the stereorypes in postcolonial theory is insufficient basis for a respon-
sible criticism.29
Bahri's odd blend of caricature and attention to the singular case bears
out Wendy Brown's observation that, while historiography based on
notions of progress has been discredited, no obvious political substitute
has emerged for 'progressive understandings of where we have come
from and where we are going'.JO In practice a kind of lax pragmatism has
meant that even work attentive to the claims of subaltern and minoriry
groups still tends to beg many questions by employing as its aspirational
norm the autonomous, willing, reasoning, rights-bearing subject, liber-
ated from the last feudal shackles of prejudice and supposedly free to
possess itself as itself. Even as it acknowledges that 'the Irish' and 'the
British' are often not so easily opposable, Bahri's chapter on 'the Irish
case' still pivots on the undiscussed liberal norm, even as her book must
query its (overwhelmingly American) institutional context. In this way,
much so-called 'postcolonial' criticism often deploys a moralistic criti-
cism of one empire in terms that effectively bolster the ideological under-
pinnings of its successor. It is striking to observe that if the terms of the
inclusion/exclusion or other-within model were to be employed in turn
on much of the criticism that uses it, this would only produce, as it surely
does in Bahri's chapter, a cultural political reading underlining the
present role of rhe United Kingdom as a client state of rhe US.
Conclusion
To return then to Jean-Luc Nancy's claim that the danger for democracy
lies in the temptation to find foundations for it. The pervasive implicit
discourse of individual rights in the resistance vs. exclusion models of the
dominant cultural ism is precisely such a foundationalism. It prescribes
specific notions of individualism and 'free' agency' which perpetuate the
intertwining of democracy with capitalism, and closes off the force of
debate and contestation inherent to the literary space."
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This study argues that the thinkers presented here offer a mare fruit-
ful - a mare just - ideal for reading literary texts; that even the contro-
versial Heidegger of the Holderlin readings is mare genuinely
thought-provoking than the American 'infringed-eitizens'-rights' model.
Each thinker, in differenr ways, elaborates what is a simply logical con-
sequence of the idea that something or someone is 'singular': that the
attempt to understand is going to reach a point at which its object can
no longer be situated in terms of given concepts or explained in relation
to known contexts or causes. Likewise, this means an acute sensitivity to
the violence of stereotyping in others, in any issue, text or mode of
research. To drive towards acknowledgement of the singular has often
been an essential element in the ethics of scholarship and intellectual life.
It must, of course, finally be cut short at some point, if conceptualisation
and understanding are to be possible at all. But what is distinctive in the
thinkers covered here is the challenging degree to which this point is held
off. Each is intensely wary of the reductive violence that always lurks in
the need to categorise or to conclude.
If one contrasts such thinking to the dominant culruralism of much
contemporary work, the laner's crudity is striking. Perhaps, as a counter-
weight, there is a need to recognise the extent to which all over-general
schemas and machines of interpretation (with categories imagined to
apply across the globe in some cases) can act as a kind of evasion. For
the contemporary critic, an ethics of singularity may also be a safeguard
against all the institutional pressures to assume in one's own writing the
mantle of an unjustified exceptionalism.
Also inherent in the idea of the singularity is the possibility of a radical
break or rupture from the past. To be singular is, by definition, to refuse
to be fully intelligible through heritage or environment. Nancy pushes
the received idea of freedom as autonomy to a point at which it teveals
its own conditions in a deeper and necessarily ungrounded notion of the
free:
Auto-nomy, which has always represented the very regime of freedom, must
be understood on this basis: as a legislation by the self in which the self does
not preexist, since its very existence is what is prescribed by the law, and this
law itself is not based on any right, since it founds with its own juris-diction
the possibility of a 'right' in general. Freedom is not a right, it is the right of
what is 'by rights' without right: with this radicaliry it mUSt be understood as
fact, as initial and revolutionary.Jl
The 'law' hete prescribes something that is not subordinated to anything
prior: 'Freedom cannot but precede itself in its own command. 'JJ
Hannah Arendt writes:
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The moment we want to say who somebody is, our very vocabulary leads us
asuay into saying what he is; we get entangled in a description of qualities he
necessarily shares with others like him; we begin to describe a type or a 'char-
acter' in the old meaning of the word, with the result that his specific unique-
ness escapes us.
This frustration has the closest affinity with the well-known philosophic
impossibility to arrive at a definition of man, all definitions being determina-
tions or interpretations of what man is, of qualities, therefore, which he could
possibly share with other living beings, whereas his specific difference would
be found in a determination of what kind of a 'who' he is. 34
While the title of Nancy's The Experience of Freedom (1988) suggests
that study as the obvious teference here, my preference in the following
chapters will be to deploy analogies between work in the four thinkers
covered there and Arendt's notion of 'nataliry'. As against Nancy's pow-
erful but rather abstract formulations, Arendt's argument affirms a capac-
iry for becoming other - for starring anew - that makes explicit how the
norion of discontinuiry inherent in singulariry can relate, for example, to
notions of reconciliation and invention. It helps map the details of spe-
cific literary readings to an alternative thinking of literature based on non-
aggressive norms, a jump out of economies of jusrice-as-retribution or the
use of cultural identiry as a principle of explanation.3S
Nataliry is inseparable from singulariry in referring to the absolute
uniqueness of each person: 'With each birrh something uniquely new
comes into the world. With respect to this somebody who is unique it
can be truly said that nobody was there before.''' 'Nataliry' also recom-
mends itself as a concept that feeds, directly and powerfully, into think-
ing about the nature of education, offering a sense of what a scene of
teaching and reading may look like that fully engages the issue of human
freedom. Nataliry underlies human freedom as the capacity 'to establish
relations and create new realities.''' ataliry is thus 'the essence of edu-
cation,jS and of the arr of teaching. For every student, facing what for a
teacher rna y be the oldest exercise or the most familiar text, it is still a
first time. Natasha Levinson writes of what she calls 'the paradox of
nataliry':
Each newcomer brings with himlher the possibiliry thaI the world might be
reinvigorated. However, this continual influx of newcomers means that these
attempts to rejuvenate the world are constantly interrupted and set off coursc.
Herein lies both the promise and the pathos of the new: each of us has the
capacity to renew a world that seems to each generation 'out of joint,' yet this
process is never completed. The world is never set right once and for all . ..
It is constantly in need of the renewal that natality makes possible.Jq
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The dominant thinking in criticism for the past decade and more has
been deterministic in its basic arguments. And it is surely right that
readers and students be exposed to a sense of how the past, with its
bewildering mix of achievements and wrongs, determines their present
contexts, even down to elements of themselves they may previously
simply have taken as given. To find oneself responsible for a world one
did not make is a crucial experience of education or of coming to adult-
hood anywhere. Derrida observes that 'We inherit a language, conditions
of life, a culture which is, which carries the memory of what has been
done, and the responsibility, so then we are responsible for things we
have nOt done ourselves, and that is part of the concept of heritage."·
However, there is also a danger that criticism which inculcates a strong
sense of how cultural identity (in terms of ethnicity, nationality, gender,
etc.) determines how a person will be perceived or treated may actually
reinforce past oppressions. Levinson argues:
If students feel trapped by their social positioning, they 3Te unlikely to act.
Instead, they become resigned to their social positioning OT, worse, they
become resentful of others. Depending on the social positioning of the
student, this resentment may manifest itself in anger or at being forced into
the category of oppressor, or in anger that results from a hisrory of victimiza-
tion, marginalization, or oppression that is simultaneously denied and rein-
forced by the broader culrure.41
In the seminar room, few things are more hurtful than for a person to
find herself or himself treated or addressed as a type, or be taken solely
as a member of a certain group or supposed category of person - a
teacher can even be disciplined for it. Yet everyone, knowing herself or
himself to be unique, continually encounters strangers as types in just this
way and a great deal of criticism now even depends on this kind of think-
ing. Arendt concedes that the chances that tomorrow will repeat today
are almost overwhelming, but the mere fact of natality means that the
chance of invention and novelty is never extinguished. Those thinkers I
have categorised under the rubric of a 'poetics of singularity' offer an
understanding of the reading of the literary as a space in which natality
is preserved.
Natality can correspond to moments when we become social actors,
taking responsibility upon ourselves for our words or acts and refusing
passively to fulfil a role, obey conventional expectations or to behave as
'normal' or 'expected' for the type of the person society may cast us as.
The feature that defines an agent in Arendt's sense is the capacity for a
kind of existential jump, to initiate something unexpected. 'To act, in its
most general sense, means to take an initiative, to begin . .. Because they
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are initium, newcomers and beginners by virtue of birth, men take initia-
tive, are prompted into action.'<42 The four thinkers covered here, while
not using Arendt's own term and with related but differing agenda, can
be said to engage in the literary or poetic in relation to just this possibil-
ity of beginning, in both its elusiveness and excitement.
50 the topic of singularity engages the force of a crucial 'post-existen-
tialist' strain in each of the thinkers treated here. This is something that has
come increasingly to the fore in Derrida's work of the past dozen years or
so (the terminology of 'singular', 'absolute', 'universal' and 'paradox/para-
doxical' recalling that of 5eren Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling
(1843)).<43 Each offers, in relation to literature and beyond, a meditation on
the irreducible singularity of each human life, so that, contrary to deter-
ministic models of culture, the possibility of the completely new is always
at work. As Kierkegaard writes, in relation to the crucial commitments,
each generation starts again and can learn only very little from its prede-
cessors. The non-liberal notion of freedom is decisive here - the 'dizziness
of freedom' (Kierkegaard).«
